

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0053

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652 XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 18, 1974

(SALT TWO - 432)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY MINISTER
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF SEPTEMBER 18, 1974.

SEMENOV STATEMENT, SEPTEMBER 18, 1974.

YOUR STATEMENT WILL BE STUDIED WITH ALL DUE ATTENTION.
I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO CLARIFY THE POSITIONS YOU OUTLINED
IN GENERAL TERMS.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR AND THE U.S., THE DELEGATIONS
TODAY RESUME THEIR WORK. THE VERY FACT THAT THE DELEGATIONS
OF THE TWO LARGEST NUCLEAR POWERS RESUME NEGOTIATIONS ON A
QUESTION OF SUCH IMPORTANCE FOR THE VITAL DESTINIES OF NATIONS
INSPIRES UNDERSTANDABLE HOPE.

THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. ON THE
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS ARE AN IMPORTANT LINK IN

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THE CHAIN OF EFFORTS AIMED AT REDUCING THE RISK OF WAR, IMPROV-

ING THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND FURTHER DEVELOPING SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. THE AGREEMENTS IN FORCE IN THE AREA UNDER CONSIDERATION, WHICH WERE CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S, ARE INSTRUMENTS FOR A GENERAL IMPROVEMENT OF THESE RELATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AS A WHOLE.

CONCLUSION OF TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS AND ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES DURING THE YEARS 1972-1974 MET WITH A WIDE POSITIVE RESPONSE IN OUR COUNTRIES AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THESE AGREEMENTS ARE JUSTIFIABLY REGARDED AS AN IMPORTANT POSITIVE FACTOR WHICH FAVORABLY INFLUENCES THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE WORLD.

THE SOVIET SIDE IS PREPARED TO EXERT EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT NEW STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION.

THE TASK OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS DEFINED BY THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN JULY 1974. THE DELEGATIONS HAVE BEEN CHARGED WITH THE RESPONSIBLE DUTY OF SEARCHING FOR WAYS TO ACHIEVE A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE NEW AGREEMENT IN THE FIELD OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985.

THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION ON QUESTIONS OF LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS ENSUES FROM THE OVERALL APPROACH OF THE SOVIET STATE TO QUESTIONS OF STRENGTHENING PEACE, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, HALTING THE ARMS RACE, AND DISARMAMENT. IT HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED BY BOTH POWERS THAT IN THE NUCLEAR AGE THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO CONDUCTING MUTUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. ON THE BASIS OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE.

CURBING THE RACE IN STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS AND LIMITING THEM IS A SUBSTANTIAL AND GENUINE CONTRIBUTION TO THE CAUSE OF REDUCING THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR, ESPECIALLY BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THIS IS DETERMINED FIRST AND FOREMOST BY THE OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS AND BY THE ACTUAL COURSE OF HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. TO ACHIEVE POSITIVE RESULTS IN THE DIRECTION OF A FURTHER LIMITATION OF THE MOST DANGEROUS MODERN TYPES OF ARMAMENTS, WHICH IS UNDER CONSIDERATION AT OUR NEGOTIATIONS,

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AND THUS TO STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL PEACE, IS A TASK IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF WHICH ARE INTERESTED NOT ONLY OUR TWO STATES, BUT ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD AS WELL.

THE SOVIET UNION'S POLICY, AIMED AT ESTABLISHING A LASTING PEACE AND PREVENTING ANOTHER WAR, IS NOT DEPENDENT ON CONSIDERATIONS OF THE MOMENT; IT EXPRESSES THE ESSENCE OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST SYSTEM. IN THE PRESENT HISTORICAL AGE IT REFLECTS

THE DEEPEST NEEDS OF ALL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES AND IS IN LINE WITH ACTUAL OPPORTUNITIES AND CONDITIONS. OF COURSE, THIS DEMANDS UNCEASING AND PERSISTENT EFFORTS.

GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, L.I. BREZHNEV, SAID ON SEPTEMBER 7, 1974 IN NOVOROSIYSK: "OF COURSE, WE STILL CANNOT CLAIM THAT A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR PEACE HAS ALREADY BEEN LAID IN EUROPE, NOT TO SPEAK OF THE WHOLE GLOBE. THIS WOULD BE PREMATURE. HOWEVER, WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE AND IS BEING DONE IN THAT DIRECTION OPENS UP HOPEFUL PROSPECTS. A GREAT MANY COMPLICATED QUESTIONS STILL HAVE TO BE RESOLVED FOR THESE PROSPECTS TO BECOME REALITY.

"WE SEE OUR SACRED DUTY IN EXERTING MAXIMUM EFFORTS IN THE FUTURE AS WELL, SO THAT NOT ONLY ALL OF US, BUT ALSO OUR CHILDREN, GRANDCHILDREN AND GREAT-GRANDCHILDREN NO LONGER KNOW WAR, THAT ALL NATIONS MAY LIVE IN PEACE AND ENGAGE IN HEALTHY MUTUAL RELATIONS."

WE HAVE ALREADY EMPHASIZED AT THESE NEGOTIATIONS THAT THE PRINCIPAL CONTENT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S FOREIGN POLICY IS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM OF PEACE, WHICH WAS ADVANCED BY THE 24TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU. IN THE DOCUMENT ON THE RESULTS OF THE THIRD SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT MEETING THE POLITBUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR AND THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR DECLARED THEIR DETERMINATION TO WORK CONSISTENTLY FOR THE REALIZATION OF THE PROGRAM OF PEACE.

THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE, DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND DETENTE ARE AN OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENT OF OUR TIMES. ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE GOALS REQUIRES AGREED AND PURPOSEFUL ACTIONS. APPEALS CALLING FOR CONTINUATION AND INTENSIFICATION OF THE ARMS RACE ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING PEACE.

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SIFICATION OF THE ARMS RACE ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING PEACE.

AS NOTED BY GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, L.I. BREZHNEV, THE ARMS RACE AND THE INCIPENT INTERNATIONAL DETENTE ARE TWO PROCESSES THAT GO IN OPPOSITE DIRECTIONS. THEY CANNOT DEVELOP ENDLESSLY, ON PARALLEL COURSES SO TO SPEAK. THEREFORE THE QUESTION OF COMPLEMENTING POLITICAL DETENTE BY MILITARY DETENTE IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES ACQUIRES AN ESPECIALLY TIMELY SIGNIFICANCE. THE WORLD CANNOT BE BUILT ON A POWDER MAGAZINE WHICH NOW HAS BEEN FILLED WITH NUCLEAR MISSILES. THE PROCESS OF DETENTE MUST LEAD TO LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, ABOVE ALL NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS. THE LEADERSHIP OF THE USSR FIRMLY BELIEVES THAT THE STEPS TAKEN IN THIS DIRECTION,

INCLUDING THE EFFORTS TO LIMIT STRATEGIC ARMS, MUST BE
CONTINUED AND, MOREOVER, MUST BE PRODUCTIVE.

IN THE SOVIET UNION WE ARE AWARE OF U.S. PRESIDENT GERALD
FORD'S STATEMENT AT THE JOINT SESSION OF BOTH HOUSES OF THE
U.S. CONGRESS IN AUGUST 1974, IN WHICH, REFERRING TO USSR-
U.S. RELATIONS, THE PRESIDENT SAID: "TO OUR TWO PEOPLES, AND
TO ALL MANKIND, WE OWE A CONTINUED EFFORT TO LIVE, AND WHERE
POSSIBLE, TO WORK TOGETHER IN PEACE; FOR IN A THERMO-NUCLEAR
AGE, THERE CAN BE NO ALTERNATIVE TO A POSITIVE AND PEACEFUL
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR NATIONS."

IN HIS MESSAGE OF AUGUST 11, 1974 TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
U.S., THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF
THE USSR EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
USSR AND THE U.S. DURING THE COMING YEARS WILL BE FURTHERDEVE-
LOPED CONSTRUCTIVELY TO THE BENEFIT OF THE PEOPLES OF BOTH
COUNTRIES AND IN THE INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING UNIVERSAL PEACE
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

THE TASK THE USSR DELEGATION HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH IS A
PART OF THIS PROCESS. ITS ACCOMPLISHMENT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO
ACHIEVING THIS OBJECTIVE. OF COURSE, WE ARE ALSO AWARE OF
OPPOSING TENDENCIES. WE PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT EVERY-
THING POSITIVE THAT HAS APPEARED IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS
IN RECENT YEARS WILL BE DEVELOPED IN THE INTERESTS OF STRENG-
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THENING PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2296

INFO DOD WASHDC
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SOLUTIONS IN THE AREA WE ARE CONSIDERING MUST BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. THE TWO SIDES HAVE FORMALLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THIS PRINCIPLE IS FUNDAMENTAL FOR THE APPROACH TO THE TASK OF LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS.

SUCCESS OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS WILL DEPEND UPON HOW CONSISTENTLY THE SIDES WILL STRIVE TO IMPLEMENT IN FULL MEASURE THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE AND FOLLOW A COURSE TOWARD RESOLVING PROBLEMS ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY AND MUTUAL ACCOUNT FOR SECURITY INTERESTS.

THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET SIDE IS GOVERNED BY THE DECISIONS OF THE 24TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU, WHICH EMPHASIZED THAT "DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL, AND ESPECIALLY NEGOTIATIONS AT WHICH VERY DELICATE MILITARY AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS ARE DISCUSSED, CAN BE PRODUCTIVE ONLY IF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SIDES ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN AN EQUAL DEGREE AND IF NO ONE SEEKS TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES."

THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE SPECIFICALLY IMPLIES THAT THE VERY
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NATURE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS RENDER INADMISSIBLE EFFORTS AIMED AT OBTAINING SOME SORT OF ADVANTAGE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE OTHER SIDE, OR EFFORTS AIMED AT OBTAINING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS, IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS, THAT APPEALS HEARD FROM TIME TO TIME IN SOME QUARTERS TO NEGOTIATE "FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH", TO ACCUMULATE AND MAKE USE OF SO-CALLED BARGAINING CHIPS, ARE IRRATIONAL, INAPPROPRIATE AND INCONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVES AND TASKS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE EVENTS OF RECENT DECADES IS WITNESS TO THE FACT THAT SUCCESS AT NEGOTIATIONS, AND PARTICULARLY AT SUCH AS OURS, AND DETENTE AS A WHOLE, CANNOT BE ACHIEVED FROM SUCH POSITIONS, THAT THE ROAD TO LASTING PEACE LIES IN FURTHER STRENGTHENING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND INCREASING MUTUAL TRUST. IT IS CLEAR THAT STATES

CANNOT ACHIEVE ENHANCED STRATEGIC ARMS RACE. EACH NEW SPIRAL IN THE ARMS RACE MEANS CLIMBING ONTO A NEW AND POTENTIALLY EVEN MORE EXPLOSIVE LEVEL, AND MOREOVER NEITHER SIDE CAN SAY THAT SUCH A PROCESS AFFECTS ITS OWN SECURITY TO A LESSER DEGREE. IF THERE SHOULD BE ANY SUCH VIEWS, I MUST SAY: IT IS RATHER THE OTHER WAY ROUND. SPEAKING FRANKLY, WE ARE AGAINST THE ARMS RACE FOR THE VERY REASON THAT IT UNDERMINES THE FOUNDATIONS OF UNIVERSAL PEACE, INCREASES INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND UNDERMINES WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED, IN THE FIELD OF ARMS LIMITATION AS WELL.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

THE USSR DELEGATION CAME TO GENEVA WITH FIRM INSTRUCTIONS FROM ITS AUTHORITIES TO CONDUCT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN A BUSINESSLIKE AND CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT. WE INTEND TO MAKE USE OF ALL OPPORTUNITIES FOR AN ACTIVE SEARCH FOR WAYS TO WORK OUT, ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS, A NEW AGREEMENT IN THE FIELD OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

WE PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS IN THIS MAJOR AND IMPORTANT CAUSE THE DELEGATIONS WILL MAKE AN EFFORT TO WORK CREATIVELY, WITH INITIATIVE AND IN A SPIRIT OF SEARCHING FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS BEFORE US. CREATIVE ENDEAVOR AND SKILL IN TAKING A FRESH LOOK AT THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM WOULD HELP

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OUR WORK VERY SUBSTANTIALLY.

AT THE SAME TIME, CREATIVE USE OF THE EXPERIENCE ALREADY GAINED AT THE NEGOTIATIONS CAN EFFECTIVELY ASSIST US.

IT MAY BE QUITE JUSTIFIABLY ASSERTED THAT IN STARTING OUR WORK ON A NEW AGREEMENT, WE STAND ON THE FIRM FOUNDATION OF ALREADY EXISTING ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION.

WE EXPECT AN IDENTICAL APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PART OF THE U.S. DELEGATION AS WELL. I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE ATMOSPHERE OF BUSINESSLIKE CREATIVE COOPERATION, WHICH EXISTED IN THE PAST AND LED TO POSITIVE RESULTS, WILL BE MAINTAINED IN OUR WORK, AND THAT THIS WILL CONTRIBUTE TO NEW RESULTS, NO LESS IMPORTANT THAN THOSE OUR COUNTRIES ACTUALLY SUCCEEDED IN ACHIEVING. JOHNSON

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